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INTRODUCTION

This article sets out the essential and distinctive features of the Japanese systems-criminal, civil, and administrative-for sanctioning persons
causing medically related injury and for compensating the injured., The
article seeks to place those systems in historical and social context.
Patients in Japan obtain their health care on a price-controlled, fee-forservice basis. Insurance coverage is virtually universal: since 1961, every
legal resident has been entitled to receive care through a mixture of private
and public plans.2 The proportion of GDP that Japan devotes to health care,
8.5 percent as of 2008, is less than almost all other advanced industrial
nations, and only about half that of the industrialized world's least efficient
health care system, the United States. 3 Yet Japan's longevity and infant
mortality statistics are among the world's best,4 and technological sophistication at Japan's top hospitals parallels that available anywhere.
Nevertheless, iatrogenic harm-injury resulting from medical carehas long been a simmering concern. The number of civil malpractice
claims, though relatively small, rose steadily through the 1980s and 1990s. 5
During the same period, dissatisfaction with physicians' paternalistic attitudes, a scandal over HIV-contaminated blood supply, a national debate
over brain death issues, and concern over excessive and irrational drug
prescriptions combined to undercut the public's previously almost unquestioned faith in medicine's beneficence.6 These developments fed a growing
current of public opinion favoring transparency in medicine, reflecting
1. The article is not confined to medical malpractice, in the sense of treatment failing to meet the
legal standard of due care. The article's scope also encompasses other medically related death and
injury; hence the use of "misadventure," a term bequeathed to us in this context by the New Zealanders.
See GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 255 (1979); Ken Oliphant, Defining "Medical Misadventure": Lessons from New Zealand, I MED. L. REv. 4 (1996).
2. JOHN C. CAMPBELL & NAOKI IKEGAMI, THE ART OF BALANCE IN HEALTH POLICY:
MAINTAINING JAPAN'S LOW-COST, EGALITARIAN SYSTEM 1-20 (1998).
3. OECD.Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx (last visited July 8, 2011); Colin
Pritchard & Mark S. Wallace, Comparing the USA, UK and 17 Western Countries' Efficiency and
Effectiveness in Reducing Mortality, 2 J. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. SHORT REP. 60 (2011), available at
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2011/08/07/JRSMpaperPritWall.pdf (noting
inefficiency of US health care system).
4. Jonathan Cylus & Gerard F. Anderson, Multinational Comparisons of Health Systems Data,
2006 (Commonwealth Fund 2007), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/ Publications/Chartbooks/2007/May/Multinational-Comparisons-of-Health-Systems-Data-2006.aspx
(last
visited March 27, 2011). See generally Nayu Ikeda et al., What Has Made the Population of Japan
Healthy?, 378 THE LANCET 1094 (2011) (survey of reasons for Japanese longevity).
5. See infra note 53, fig. 2.
6. See Robert B Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients' Rights in Japan, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1
(1996) [hereinafter Leflar, Informed Consent].
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movements toward greater openness in other spheres of society. Marking
this trend toward transparency, around the turn of the 21st century, were
court decisions advancing principles of informed consent,7 enactments of
information disclosure measures, 8 and provisions for patients' access to
their medical records.9
Beginning in 1999, reports of a series of errors at hospitals of high repute filled the headlines and newscasts. The first notorious case arose from
switched-patient surgeries in Yokohama.o Under the eyes of the nation's
media, subsequent cases occurred in quick succession in Tokyo itself. A
nurse accidentally injected a toxic agent, killing her patient.'] An inexperienced team of young doctors bungled delicate laparoscopic surgery while
insufficiently trained on the equipment, having also neglected to secure an
adequate supply of the patient's rare blood type.12 A child died after an
operation at a major pediatric cardiovascular surgery center,13 one among a
series of children's deaths at the center. In each of these cases, physicians
and hospital personnel altered medical records, gave misleading accounts
of events to bereaved families or investigating officials, or engaged in other

7. See, e.g., Judgment of Supreme Court Feb. 29, 2000, 54 MINSHO 582 (damages awarded
Jehovah's Witness for violating her blood transfusion refusal, despite transfusion's life-saving effects)
[hereinafter Jehovah's Witness case]. The case is available in English translation in CURTIS J.
MILHAUPT, J. MARK RAMSEYER & MARK D. WEST, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES
AND COMMENTARY 347-356 (2006).

8. Gy~sei kikan no hoyo-suru j6h6 no k6kai ni kansuru h6ritsu [Law on Access to Information
Held by Administrative Organs], Law No. 42 of 1999 [hereinafter Information Disclosure Law]. This
national law was preceded by various local freedom of information ordinances, a process well described
in David Boling, Access to Government-HeldInformation in Japan: Citizens' "Right to Know" Bows to
the Bureaucracy,34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998).
9. See MINISTRY OF HEALTH & WELFARE (JAPAN), KARUTE-TO NO SHINRYO JOHO NO KATSUTO NI
KANSURU KENTOKAl HOKOKUSHO [REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION ON THE USE OF MEDICAL

CHARTS AND INFORMATION] (1998); Robert B Leflar, Law andHealth Care in Japan: The Renaissance
of Informed Consent, in TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, READINGS IN COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW &

BIOETHICS 154, 159 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Leflar, Renaissance] (summarizing health ministry
measures promoting patient access to medical records); and infra note 93 and accompanying text.
10. At Yokohama City Medical University Hospital, a lung patient had part of his heart valve
removed, and a heart patient with a similar name had part of his lung excised. Three doctors and two
nurses were found criminally liable for professional negligence. Judgment of Yokohama Dist. Ct. Sept.
20, 2001, 1087 HANREI TAIMUZU 296 (Yokohama switched-surgery case).
11. After this event at Tokyo's Hir6 Hospital, two nurses were convicted of criminal professional
negligence, and the hospital director was found guilty of submitting a false death certificate and failing
to report the death to police in a timely fashion. Judgment of Supreme Court April 13, 2004, 58(4)
KEISHO 247 [hereinafter Hir6 Hospital case].
12. See Robert B Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Erroras ReportableEvent, as Tort, as Crime:
A Transpacific Comparison, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 192-95 (2005), reprinted in 22 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR JAPANISCHES RECHT/J. JAP. L. 39, 43-45 (2006) (recounting Aoto Hospital story).
13. See Robert B Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths," Criminal Sanctions, and Medical Quality Improvement in Japan, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 6 (2009), reprintedin 29 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR JAPANISCHES RECHT/J. JAP. L. 5, 9 (2010) [hereinafter Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths"] (recounting
Tokyo Women's Medical University Hospital story).
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untrustworthy acts. Many other cases of alleged malpractice surfaced
around the country.
Media coverage of these iatrogenic deaths and injuries sparked public
questioning of the medical profession's self-policing mechanismsquestioning that the profession was ill-prepared to answer. Institutional
structures to monitor the quality of Japan's medical care have historically
been weak. Medical licensure and discipline authority, exercised by the
Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare, seldom inquired into failures of patient safety.14 Hospital peer review was conducted with a soft touch, if at
all, and the claimed impartiality of hospitals' internal reviews of adverse
events was met with increasing public skepticism. The hierarchical system
of medical education and job placement strongly discouraged any open
questioning of practices taught by revered professors (who controlled career postings), even if such practices were outmoded or scientifically unproven. 5 The hospital accreditation system fostered good safety practices
only marginally; hospitals need not receive accreditation to qualify for
reimbursement for examinations, procedures and medications provided to
patients, and only 29 percent of hospitals are accredited today.16 The nation's patchwork death inquiry system functioned with efficacy in only a
few urban areas, and even there, seldom focused on medical-practiceassociated causes of death and their prevention.17 Civil litigation over alleged malpractice, as discussed below, provided only a modest and intermittent brake on medical error. Until the 2009 introduction of a no-fault
system for compensating obstetrical injuries, administrative compensation
systems were confined to a few limited categories of disease sufferers.

14. See id at 20 & n. 87 (summarizing research of Dr. Etsuji Okamoto and author's interview
with health ministry staff concerning work of the Ministry's medical discipline committee, the Medical
Ethics Council (Id6 shingikai)).
15. See, e.g., CAMPBELL & IKEGAMI, supra note 2, at 188-189 (criticizing quality assurance and
peer review in Japanese hospitals); Hideki Hashimoto, Naoki Ikegami et al., Cost Containment and
Quality of Care in Japan: Is There a Trade-Off? 378 THE LANCET 1174, 1178 (2011) ("Physicians'
practice patterns tend to be idiosyncratically set by the chair and professor of the university clinical
department.").
16. Of Japan's 8,650 hospitals, 2,469 are accredited as of November 2011. Japan Council for
Quality Health Care, By6in kina hy6ka kekka no j6h6 teiky6 [Information on Results of Hospital
Evaluations], available at http://www.report.jcqhc.or.jp. In any case, accreditation criteria do not address compliance with standards of evidence-based medicine or honesty with patients about adverse
events.
17. Tatsuya Fujimiya, Legal Medicine andthe DeathInquiry System in Japan: Their Development
and a Comparative Study, in MEDICINE AND THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 119TH INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF MEDICINE, EAST AND WEST 129, 152, 156 (Yasuo

Otsuka & Shizu Sakai eds., 1998) (article from a 1994 symposium); Leflar, "UnnaturalDeaths," supra
note 13, at 25-30.
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In short, at the turn of the 21st century, weaknesses in professional
self-regulation, administrative oversight, the death inquest system, and civil
litigation left Japanese medicine to operate within an accountability vacuum. 18 Attempting to fill part of that gap in public accountability, the criminal justice system-its workings amplified by the media-stepped up its
engagement with iatrogenic harm cases.
I. PROSECUTIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

A. Prosecutionsin Medical Cases
Prosecutors have typically brought charges against health care personnel on any of three grounds. The first, and most common, is "professional
negligence causing death or injury."l9 This crime is derived, like most of
Japan's Criminal Code, from the German penal code.20 The mens rea required for conviction, as a formal matter, is simple negligence, although as
a practical matter the cases in which prosecutors obtain convictions typically involve acts or omissions amounting to gross negligence or recklessness.2 1

18. This argument is developed more fully in Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths," supra note 13, and
Leflar & Iwata, supranote 12.
19. KEIHO [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 211 (Gy6muj6 kashitsu chishish6-t6). The typical defendants
charged with this crime are traffic offenders, but other professionals such as architects, pilots, and
physicians are sometimes sanctioned as well.
When convicted, such professionals are fined but rarely serve prison sentences. See Haruo Yamaguchi,
Iry5 jiko no keii shobun to purofuesshonaru 5tonomii [Criminal Sanctionsfor Medical Accidents and
ProfessionalAutonomy], 695 NiIGATA-KEN ISHIKAiHO 2, 2 tbl. 1 (2008) (reporting four cases of imprisonment out of 253 criminal sanctions in medical cases from 1950-2007). However, while under investigation physicians, like other suspects, may languish in police detention for a considerable period. For
example, Dr. Kazuki Sata, who was arrested, prosecuted, and acquitted in the Tokyo Women's Medical
University Hospital case, Leflar, "UnnaturalDeaths, " supra note 13, at 6, was detained and interrogated for three months. Interview with Dr. Kazuki Sat6, in Tokyo (Aug. 7, 2009). Moreover, even if a
convicted professional's ultimate formal sanction is merely pecuniary, the conviction itself is usually
enough to force a career change, through either loss of medical license or personal shame, so effectively
the punishment is ultimately quite significant.
Although criminal prosecutions and civil damage claims are formally separate, they sometimes proceed in parallel fashion, and the proceedings of each can influence the other. See infra note 21.
20. See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 416 (2d ed. 1999).

21. See Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths, " supra note 13, at 16 n. 65 for a discussion of what "negligence" means in criminal law in Japan and France.
Tokyo prosecutors responsible for medical cases informed the author that during the first wave of
these prosecutions the most important factors in decisions about whether to prosecute were the bringing
of a complaint by the patient or family, the degree of injury, the flagrancy of the medical personnel's
acts or omissions, the clarity of proof of negligence, and failure by medical personnel to provide compensation and apologies. Interview with Shaji Iwamura, Takayuki Aonuma, and Atsushi Sat6, Tokyo
District Prosecutor's Office, and Prof Futoshi Iwata, Sophia University, in Tokyo (July 25, 2001). The
prosecutors averred, perhaps disingenuously, that social goals such as deterrence of medical error
formed no part of their motivation for bringing charges.
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A second ground for prosecution is concealment or destruction of evidence.22 Physicians and nurses attempting to cover up medical mistakes by
altering patients' medical charts have been found criminally liable for this
offense. 23
The third basis for recent prosecutions of physicians is failure to notify
police in a timely fashion of "unnatural deaths." Physicians once assumed
that this notification requirement, found in Article 21 of the Medical Practitioners' Law,24 applied only to violent deaths, suicides, infectious diseases
threatening public health, and the like. However, when the CEO of Tokyo's
Hir6 Hospital in 2000 submitted a falsified death certificate for a patient
killed by an accidental toxic injection and delayed reporting the death to
police, prosecutors-fully aware of intensified public concern over medical
errors-charged the CEO with violating Article 21. The Supreme Court,
affirming his conviction in 2004, confirmed that the "unnatural death" notification requirement may encompass deaths causally related to medical
management. 25
The Hir5 Hospital CEO's arrest and subsequent conviction placed
hospital administrators in a dilemma. For purposes of medical care, no
clear definition of "unnatural death" exists. When a patient dies following
less-than-optimal care, should the hospital routinely notify police, inviting
criminal investigation disruptive of hospital routine and patient care, or
avoid notification and risk public condemnation for a cover-up and possible
criminal prosecution? The number of reports to police of medically related
death and injury, and the number of cases police referred to prosecutors,
increased for several years after 1999 (Figure 1). The "unnatural death"
notification requirement, and the concomitant (if variable and sporadic)
police oversight of medical practice, generated intense controversy.

Fig. 1: Medical accidents reported to police; cases police sent to prosecutors, 1997-2010.
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Critics of the criminal justice system's involvement in monitoring
medical mistakes raise concerns relating to police lack of medical expertise, disruption of patient care by criminal investigations, disproportionality
of criminal sanctions to the inadvertence typical of lapses in care, and criminal law's tendency to focus on individual blame rather than addressing
more significant problems of system failure.27 Even granting the substantial
merit of these criticisms, criminal law's prominence in regulating medical
quality in the early years of this century is understandable in light of these
factors: (1) public expectation that the criminal justice system's protective
reach does not stop at the hospital doors; (2) police and prosecutors' commitment to professional duty in enforcing the criminal code, applicable by
its terms to medical personnel as to everyone else; and (3) the need in a
democratic society for public accountability of the medical profession for
its errors, a need not adequately fulfilled in Japan by professional selfregulation, administrative oversight, the death inquest system, or civil litigation.
B. Response by the Health Ministry and the Medical Profession
The Ministry of Health, Labor & Welfare (MHLW) had given
short shrift before 1999 to patient safety issues. In reaction to the controversy over highly publicized medical errors, the ministry, beginning in
2000, created a small patient safety office, drafted guidance manuals for
hospitals to designate risk management staff, set up adverse event tracking
systems and review committees,28 established local "medical safety support
centers" to handle patients' complaints and questions, 29 required a class of
large specialized hospitals to make reports to a quasi-public entity of acci-

26. Nat'l Police Agency, Irya jiko kankei todokede-t6 kenso no id6, rikken s6chisa [Trends in
Reports of Medically Related Cases and of Cases Sent to Prosecutors] (Aug. 8, 2011), reported in Iry5
jiko todokede gensh tsuzuku; Keisatsu rikken mo 7.4%-gen [Decline in Medical Accident Reports
Continues; Cases Sent to Prosecutors also Decrease 7.4%], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN (Aug. 8, 2011)
[hereinafter Police Reports on Medical Cases].
27. See Leflar, "UnnaturalDeaths," supranote 13, at 14 & n. 53 (summarizing criticisms).
28. MHLW, Iry6 jiko j6h6 shashfi-t6 jigy6 [Medical Accident Information Collection Project],
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyokulisei/i-anzen/jiko/index.html (last visited July 5, 2011); MHLW,
RISUKU MANEIJIMENTO MANYUARU
MANAGEMENT MANUALS] (2000).

SAKUSEI SHISHIN [GUIDELINES FOR THE CREATION OF RISK

29. The medical safety support centers (iry6 anzen shien senti) received statutory authorization in
a 2006 amendment to the Medical Services Law, IRYO HO art. 6(11).
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dents causing harm, 30 and launched a study of the incidence of adverse
events in Japanese hospitals. In this study 4,389 records were randomly
selected from 18 top hospitals that volunteered to participate. Reviewers
employing criteria based on a previous Canadian study3' found an adverse
event rate of 6.8 percent, and concluded that of those adverse events, about
23 percent were preventable. 32
Troubled by the prospect of police investigations and possible
criminal liability while also recognizing the importance of clearer accountability in the handling of medical accidents, four major medical specialty
societies proposed to MHLW a new system (independent of the criminal
process) to review patient deaths possibly connected to medical management, inform the parties of facts found, and suggest preventive measures.
The health ministry, understaffed and eager to demonstrate progress in
addressing patient safety issues, agreed to fund a "Model Project for the
Investigation and Analysis of Medical Practice-Associated Deaths." The
Model Project, launched in four urban regions in 2005 for an initial term of
five years and now continuing on an extended basis in ten regions, is aimed
at conducting impartial, high-quality peer reviews of possibly iatrogenic
hospital deaths by experts unaffiliated with the hospital in question.33 Findings are reported to both the family and the hospital; a summary is made
public, with names of the patient, medical staff, hospital, and location redacted; and suggestions for prevention of recurrences are offered. The Ministry of Justice and the National Police Agency gave up none of their

30. This entity is the Japan Council for Quality in Health Care (Nihon iry6 kin6 hy6ka kik6). 273
hospitals are required to report adverse events, and roughly 400 others do so on a voluntary basis. See
Japan Council for Quality Health Care, Div. of Adverse Event Prevention, Project to Collect Medical
Near-Miss / Adverse Event Information: 2009 Annual Report 22 (2010), available at
http://www.med-safe.jp/pdf/yearreportenglish 2009.pdf [hereinafter JCQHC Report]. One suspects
that many institutions are less than diligent in performing their reporting obligations from the fact that
of the 273 hospitals to which the reporting requirement applied in 2009, sixty-one submitted no reports
at all. Id. at 25.
For an account of these administrative developments, see Leflar & Iwata, supranote 12, at 208-210.
3 1. G. Ross Baker et al., The CanadianAdverse Events Study: The Incidence of Adverse Events
amongHospital Patientsin Canada, 170 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1678 (2004).
32. HIDETO SAKAI, IRYO JIKO NO ZENKOKUTEKI HASSEI HINDO Nt KANSURU KENKYO [REPORT ON
THE NATIONWIDE INCIDENCE OF MEDICAL ACCIDENTS: III] 5, 18 (2006) (reporting 6.0 percent adverse
event rate, later corrected by MHLW to 6.8 percent); see also Shunya Ikeda, Iryd jiko hassei hindo
ch6sa kara eraretawagakuni no kanja anzen no genky5 to kadai [Patient Safety Issues Raised by the
Study of MedicalAccident Incidence], 14 KANJA ANZEN SUISHIN JANARU 56 (2006) (summarizing study
results). Estimates of annual preventable iatrogenic deaths were not given.
Since hospitals experiencing serious quality difficulties were likely underrepresented in the study, the
results cannot be deemed representative of Japanese hospitals as a whole.
33. See Nihon iry6 anzen ch6sa kik6 [Japan Medical Safety Research Organization], Shinry6 k6i
ni kanren-shita shib6 no ch6sa bunseki moderu jigy6 [Model Project for the Investigation & Analysis of
Medical Practice-Associated Deaths], http://www.medsafe.jp (last visited July 9, 2011).
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jurisdiction over medical crime but acquiesced in the Model Project's operation, for the most part holding back from criminal investigations and prosecutions in the regions in which the project operated. 34
Results from the Model Project are mixed. On the one hand, case
uptake and review efficiency have not met expectations. Cooperation from
hospitals in participating regions has been uneven-fewer 'than 100 cases
were submitted for review during the project's initial five-year period-and
despite the low numbers, delay in issuing case findings has been common. 35 On the other hand, the quality of case reviews has likely been superior to most internal hospital reviews conducted prior to the project's
inception, and the project's method-bringing together physicians, nurses,
attorneys, academics, and health bureaucrats working toward common
goals-has probably improved interdisciplinary cooperation in a society
still hierarchically structured, each field generally in silo-like separation
from the others.
Data collection and analysis for the Model Project and for the
health ministry's other adverse event reporting systems are undertaken by
the Japan Council for Quality Health Care (JCQHC), a quasi-public entity
that also performs hospital accreditations.36 To some extent, JCQHC's information dissemination efforts have aided the objective of improving
health care quality by encouraging medical facilities' experience-based
learning. However, despite the public's enormous appetite for medical
information, neither the health ministry nor JCQHC has made available
much hospital-specific health outcomes information. 37 Transparency regarding statistics about adverse events in health care is still a distant goal.

34. For a detailed overview of the Model Project, see Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths," supra note 13,
at 3 1-39.
35. Reasons for the low case uptake include physicians' unfamiliarity with the case review process, rules that the process be invoked by hospitals not families, limitation of the Model Project to death
cases (excluding nonfatal injuries), and a shortage of pathologists to perform the needed autopsies. See
Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths, " supra note 13, at 36-39; Norihiro Nakajima et al., Interim Evaluation of
the Model Projectfor the Investigation and Analysis of Medical Practice-AssociatedDeaths in Japan,
in J.MED. SAFETY 34 (Union of Risk Management for Preventive Medicine 2009).
36. See JCQHC Report, supra note 30, for a description of the information collection program.
37. The health ministry does require hospitals to report the number of operations they conduct
annually for various specified procedures. Media outlets obtain this information and compile rankings
of hospitals by procedure volume. See, e.g., SHUJUTSU-SU DE WAKARU I BYOIN [TELLING GOOD
HOSPITALS FROM THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONS] (Shikan Asahi ed., 2010); Iry to kango [Medical and
Nursing Care], in
YOMIURI
SHIMBUN
(2008),
updated
version
available at
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/iryou/medi/jitsuryoku. For an analysis based in part on these reports, see J.
Mark Ramseyer, Universal Health Insurance and the Effect of Cost Containment on Mortality Rates:
Strokes and Heart Attacks in Japan, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 309 (2009) (concluding that price
controls diminish availability of sophisticated care, costing lives).
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Building on the Model Project's structure, the health ministry and
the then-governing Liberal Democratic Party offered a proposal in 2008
essentially to expand the project's methods nationwide, setting up what
would have amounted to a national structure for peer reviews of questionable hospital deaths, independent of the criminal justice system. Both patients' rights groups and the Japan Medical Association-usually divided
by distrust-supported the proposal. However, the proposal was attacked
by a well-organized chorus of antiregulatory critics within the medical
profession. These critics were concerned that external reviews of hospital
adverse events would be overly centralized and cumbersome,38 that the
Article 21 "unnatural death" reporting requirement would not be abolished,
and that police would not be entirely removed in all cases from the monitoring of medical practice. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan issued its own proposal, somewhat closer to the position of the antiregulatory
critics.39 Many thought that the two proposals had enough in common that
a compromise could be hammered out. But after the Democratic Party of
Japan swept into power after the Summer 2009 elections, other issues took
political precedence, among them Japan's continued economic slump and,
most recently, the nation's response to the disastrous earthquake, tsunami,
and nuclear power plant meltdown of March 2011 in northeast Japan. At
this writing the proposed national peer review system remains on the back
burner. However, with the August 2011 launching of a commission to
study reforms in Japan's medical liability systems, 40 it may be that peer
review improvement projects will be placed back on the table.
C. One Prosecution Too Many: The Medical Professionals'Counterattack
and the String ofAcquittals
Police led obstetrician Katsuhiko Kat5 in handcuffs out of Ohno
Hospital in rural Fukushima prefecture in 2006, after belatedly learning of
the 2004 death of one of his patients subsequent to a particularly difficult
childbirth. The reaction against Dr. KatO's humiliating arrest (broadcast on
national news), detention, and prosecution was intense: petitions and
remonstrances poured into the National Police Agency from medical organ-

38. Or perhaps too embarrassing. Most physician critics of the health ministry proposal seemed to
this observer to be hospital-based, while the JMA, which supported the proposal, chiefly represents
smaller doctor-owned clinics. The health ministry proposal would have impacted hospitals far more
than clinics.
39. For an explanation and analysis of the two rival proposals, see Leflar, "UnnaturalDeaths,'
supra note 13, at 39-48.
40. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
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izations across the country. 41 The fervor of this reaction launched a movement led by physicians employing the slogan "iryo hakai"-"the collapsing
health care system."
The "iry5 hakai" movement has engineered a significant shift in
public opinion. The movement's proponents have called editorial and political attention to the shortage of physicians willing to attend childbirths,
particularly in rural areas, and to repeated instances of hospital emergency
rooms turning away ambulances for fear of liability exposure. 42 As one
chief cause of these problems, the movement has targeted alleged abuses of
the criminal justice system, much as medical "tort reformers" attack the
civil justice system in the United States. To be sure, other factors have
contributed to Japan's shortages in obstetrical care, such as the adoption of
a residency matching system undercutting traditional hierarchical job
placement practices that once ensured a supply of young physicians to
smaller hospitals. Nevertheless, the Ohno Hospital prosecution served as an
effective rallying point for critics of the criminal justice system's medical
oversight role. The "iry5 h5kai" movement offers sympathetic portrayals of
the plight of overworked, harassed, underappreciated physicians and the
importance of protecting them from overreaching prosecutors. The movement appears to have turned media and public attention away, to a considerable extent, from concerns over medical error.
The "iry5 hokai" movement's efforts have borne fruit not only on
the editorial pages, but also perhaps in the minds of some of the nation's
judges. Acquittals in criminal trials are extremely rare in Japan; more than
99 percent of criminal trials result in convictions.43 But in four successive
recent cases, including Dr. Kata's prosecution, medical personnel were
acquitted of all charges, and in the two cases that prosecutors appealed,44
the acquittals were affirmed.45
41. For a listing of the protest petitions, see Fukushima kenritsu Ohno Byoin no iry6 jiko mondai
ni tsuite [The Medical Accident Problem at Ohno Fukushima Prefectural Hospital],
http://www.med.or.jp/nichikara/fseimei/index.htmi (last visited July 6, 2011).
42. The slogan was apparently coined by physician Hideki Komatsu. See HIDEKI KOMATSU, IRYO
HOKAI [THE COLLAPSING HEALTH CARE SYSTEM] (2006). For an account of the causes of morale

problems among Japanese physicians and structural difficulties within Japanese medicine, see Hideo
Yasunaga, The Catastrophic Collapse of Morale Among Hospital Physicians in Japan, 2008 RISK
MGMT. & HEALTHCARE POL'Y 1, available at http://www.dovepress.com/getfile.php?filelD=3935.
43. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

178 (1999) (overall conviction rate in 1994 of 99.9 percent).
44. Japanese appellate procedure allows prosecutors to appeal not-guilty judgments on grounds of
both fact and law without violating the double jeopardy principle. See id. at 175.
45. Judgment of Fukushima Dist. Ct. Aug. 20, 2008, 16 IRYO KAISETSU HANREl 20 (Ohno Hospital case) (no appeal); Judgment of Tokyo High Ct. March 27, 2009, aff'g Judgment of Tokyo Dist. Ct.
Aug. 27, 2007, 1282 HANREt TAIMUZU 233 (Tokyo Women's Medical U. Hospital heart surgery case);
Judgment of Nagoya Dist. Ct. Feb. 27, 2007, 1296 HANREi TAIMUZU 308 (obstetrics case) (no appeal);
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This series of acquittals, in the wake of medical society protests
against physicians' arrests, constitutes a major public embarrassment for
Japan's procuracy. Police and prosecutors have been further embarrassed
by the recent arrests for unprofessional conduct of a top detective in the
medical investigation unit of the Tokyo police force46 and of a top prosecutor for altering evidence in the unsuccessful prosecution of a health ministry official for alleged corruption.47 These acquittals and scandals, in the
author's view, mark a watershed point in Japanese medical jurisprudence.
Henceforth, police and prosecutors will be considerably more cautious in
targeting health care personnel. 4 8 Pressures for medical quality improvement must come chiefly from other directions.
II. CIVIL LIABILITY

Compared to the specter of criminal prosecution with its careershattering effects, civil liability for medical injury has probably been less
worrisome to Japanese physicians in recent years. Civil malpractice insurance is cheap,49 and in any case hospital-employed physicians-64 percent
of the total number of doctors 5 o-are covered by their hospitals' liability
insurance policies. Nevertheless, civil liability trends are a matter of concern to the medical profession.
The number of civil claims filed in court far exceeds the number of
criminal prosecutions,51 and rose steadily from the 1980s until the peak
Judgment of Tokyo High Ct. Nov. 20, 2008, 1304 HANREI TAIMUzu 304, affg Judgment of Tokyo
Dist. Ct. March 28, 2006 (Kyorin U. waribashi[chopstick] case).
46. See, e.g., Current, Former Cops Arrested over Info Leak, DAILY YOMIURI, July 23, 2011, at I
(arrest of Lt. Shirotori for leaking police documents to cosmetic surgery hospital under investigation for
alleged case of fatal malpractice).
47. See Lead Prosecutorin Muraki Case Arrested; Maeda Admits Tampering with Seized Floppy
at
available
at
I,
Sept.
22,
2010,
TIMES,
Disk,
JAPAN
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20100922a I.html; Prosecutors Face Reforms, Restructuring,
DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 13, 2011, at 15 ("unprecedented crime" committed by special investigation
squad).
48. The number of medical cases police sent to prosecutors peaked in 2006, the year of the Ohno
Hospital arrest and subsequent protests, and has since diminished somewhat. See supra Figure 1. Police
investigations of medical crimes have not ceased, however, and prosecutions continue to be brought. In
2010 police sent papers to prosecutors in seventy-five medical cases, down from the peak of ninety-nine
in 2006. See Police Reports on Medical Cases, supra note 26; Lasik Surgeon Held over Infections;
UnsanitaryProcedures,Lack of SterilizationAlleged at Defunct Ginza Clinic, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 8,
2010, availableat http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T101207004781. htm?ref-dyolwsj.
49. See infra notes 116-122 and accompanying text.
50. See Yasunaga, supra note 42, at 2 (2006 data).
51. In 2003, for example, seventeen prosecutions were brought against physicians. See Toru
Hiyama et al., The Number of Criminal ProsecutionsAgainst Physicians Due to Medical Negligence Is
on the Rise in Japan,26 AM. J. EMERGENCY MED. 105 (2008). In the same year, 1,003 civil malpractice
cases were filed. See infra note 56.
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year of 2004, following which court filings have declined (Figure 2). In
addition, the number of claims settled out of court is doubtless a substantial
multiple of the number of court filings.52

Figure 2. Medical Malpractice Civil Cases Filed in Court, 1976-2010.53

This section of the article first sets out the salient doctrinal features
of the substantive civil law of compensation for medical injury. The article
then addresses key aspects of procedural law and practice, including the
institution of health care divisions of trial courts in some metropolitan areas, practices relating to case settlement, estimates of the total numbers of
malpractice claims (in court and out) and of medical malpractice premiums
and payouts, and information on court filing fees and plaintiffs' attorneys'
compensation practices. Finally, the new system for no-fault compensation
of certain obstetrical injuries is described.
A. Substantive Law ofMedical Malpractice

1. Theories of Recovery
Civil claims for medical injury may be brought under either the
Civil Code provision governing tort54 Or the provision governing nonper-

52. Rough estimates of the number of settlements are given below. See infra notes 106 112 and
accompanying text.
53. The Administrative Office of the Supreme Court compiles the yearly number of new medical
malpractice filings. See Supreme Court of Japan, Iji kankei sosho jiken no shori jokyo oyobi heikin
shinri kikan [Disposition of Medically Related Litigation and Mean Durations of Proceedings] [hereinafter Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Case statistics], http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/
about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei O.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2011).
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formance of contract, 55 and there are many examples of each. As a practical
matter it generally makes little difference under which theory a claim is
brought, for the standards and principles applied are the same in either
case. The plaintiff must prove in contract cases a breach of the physician's
or hospital's obligation, which is equivalent to proving a breach of the applicable standard of care in tort. In most cases, the plaintiff must prove
under either theory that the breach caused ascertainable damages.
2. Standard of Care
The Supreme Court has expressed the legal standard of care to
which physicians are held as "the standard prevailing in clinical medical
practice at the time of treatment." 56 Physician custom is not invariably congruent with the legal standard of care, however. The Supreme Court has
recognized that sometimes adherence to the custom of average medical
practitioners does not fulfill the duty of care, as when a defendant doctor,
following general practitioners' common practice of ignoring an anesthetic
drug's labeled directions for use, failed to monitor the patient's blood pressure in timely fashion.57
Japanese courts hold large, sophisticated hospitals and their physicians to a higher standard of care in some respects than doctors in small
clinics lacking equivalent resources. To quote the Supreme Court's 1995
decision in a celebrated case involving a premature infant's blindness from
retinal injury, in determining the applicable standard of care the court
"must consider various circumstances such as the nature of the [defendant]
facility and the distinctive characteristics of the region's medical environment." 58 This is taken to mean that the standard of care expected of a medical facility and its personnel depends on the facility's size and function. 59

54. Civil Code art. 709, General Principle of Tortious Act: "A person who violates intentionally or
negligently the right of another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom." HIROSHI
ODA, BASIC JAPANESE LAWS 146 (1997).

55. Civil Code art. 415, Claim for Damages for Non-Performance: "If an obligor fails to effect
performance in accordance with the tenor and purport of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages . . ." Id. at 98.
56. Judgment of Supreme Court March 30, 1982, 1039 HANREI JIHO 66, 106.
57. Judgment of Supreme Court Jan. 23, 1996, 50 MINSHO 1, 1571 HANREI JIHO 57 (perukamin-S
case).

58. Judgment of Supreme Court June 9, 1995, 1537 HANREI JIHO 3, 883 HANREi TAIMUZU 92
[hereinafter infant retrolental fibroplagia case].
59. See, e.g., TOSHIHIRO SUZUKI ET AL., IRYO JIKO NO HORITSU SODAN [THE LAW OF MEDICAL

ACCIDENTS] 36-37 (2009) (commentary on infant retrolental fibroplagia case). This approach is somewhat analogous to the resource-based locality rule applied in some US jurisdictions. See, e.g., Hall v.
Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1985) (the leading case on medical standards of care in BARRY R.
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 327-336 (6th ed. 2008)).
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The standard of knowledge (chiken) expected of physicians depends on
their specialty; non-specialists in a field are not held to the same standard
as specialists.60 However, if a physician or facility is unable to treat a patient's particular condition, whether due to lack of knowledge, skill, or
resources, the care provider comes under a legal duty to transfer the patient
to a facility that offers the requisite level of services.61

3. Level of Proof
The level of proof required of plaintiffs on breach of duty and causation is "a high degree of probability" (k5do no gaizensei).62 The phrase
suggests a level of confidence somewhat higher than the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard prevailing in civil cases in common law jurisdictions.63 Neither the Civil Code nor the case law offers an exact prescription
of how judges are to decide closely balanced issues of fact. Regarding causation, the Supreme Court has stated that at least something less than a

60. The Court recognized, however, that the time required for the diffusion of medical knowledge
from one field to another is "relatively short." Infant retrolental fibroplagia case, supra note 58, 1537
HANREI JlHO at 7-8, 883 HANREI TAIMUZU at 97; SUZUKI ET AL., supranote 59, at 37.

61. IRYO HO [MEDICAL SERVICE LAW], Law No. 205 of 1948 as amended, art. 1, para. 4 no. 3;
Judgment of Supreme Court Nov. 11, 2003, 57 MINSHO 1466, 1845 HANREI JIHO 63 (acute encephalopathy case); SUZUKI ET AL., supra note 59, at 42-43.
62. Judgment of Supreme Court Oct. 24, 1975, MINsHO 1417, 792 HANREi JlHO 3 (lumbar procedure case, addressing proof of causation). See infra note 64. The standard is of judicial rather than
statutory origin.
The "high degree of probability" standard is expressed clearly by courts with regard to causation
issues, but less clearly with regard to proof of breach of the duty of care. Judges, lawyers, and academics have suggested to the author that in practice, judges actually decide breach-of-duty issues on something like a preponderance standard, but write their opinions as though the evidence as to whether the
breach of duty was established was clearly convincing.
63. See Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedurein Comparative Law Perspective,46 U. KAN.
L. REV. 687, 708 (1998) ("[M]ere proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not enough.").
Just what "a high degree of probability" means is a matter of debate. Kevin Clermont, while recognizing the existence of controversy, has argued that the standard of proof in Japanese civil cases "requires
that facts be proven to a high probability similar to beyond a reasonabledoubt." Kevin M. Clermont,
Standards of Proofin Japan and the United States, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263, 263 (2004) (emphasis
added). He linked the Japanese standard to the intime conviction standard employed in French civil law.
This writer's interviews with Japanese judges indicate, however, that Clermont's characterization of the
Japanese proof standard as "similar to beyond a reasonable doubt" is too stringent.
Ramseyer and Nakazato, relying on an old Tokyo District Court case, fell into the opposite error
regarding malpractice claims based on tort. They stated that "[a]lthough tort plaintiffs must usually
prove causation and lack of care, in malpractice cases courts deliberately switch the burden. As a result,
to defend, a doctor will need to show that he met the standard set by other doctors in his specialty in his
community." RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at 67 (citing Judgment of Tokyo Dist. Ct. June
7, 1967, 485 HANREI JIHO 21, 25-26). The authors apparently took an atypical case involving facts
allowing for a res ipsa-like presumption of negligence, and generalized its ruling to apply to all tortbased malpractice cases. Ramseyer corrected the error in a subsequent article. Ramseyer, Malpractice
Claims, supra note 23, at 673-674.
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scientific standard of certainty will suffice.64 The author's interviews with
numerous trial judges, from several courts and encompassing the range of
judicial seniority, reveal not so much a contrariety of opinion regarding the
standard as an insistence that flexible case-by-case determinations are
needed.
The ambiguity of the standard of proof inevitably follows from the
need for discretion in addressing the subtle factual circumstances presented
by many injury claims, and relates both to institutional concern with preserving the court system's legitimacy and to trial judges' personal desire for
"cover" when their judgments are reviewed on appeal. Just as US judges,
sending factually controverted cases to juries, are disburdened by the lenient standard of appellate review of juries' factual findings, so Japanese trial
judges take a certain comfort in the degree of deference that appellate
courts usually allow the trial judges' determinations (sometimes written,
perhaps, with the same enhanced certainty of an umpire's emphatic call of a
close play at the plate) of whether plaintiffs' proofs met the "high degree of
probability" standard.65
The potential rigor of the "high degree of probability" standard is
also mitigated in three other ways: (1) the application of a res ipsa-like
rebuttable presumption of negligence where the facts warrant it;66 (2) the
adoption of "loss of chance" doctrine to justify partial compensation where
negligence is proven but its causal consequences are difficult to ascertain;67
64. See Judgment of Supreme Court Oct. 24, 1975, 29 MINSHO 1417 (lumbar procedure case).
Reversing the Tokyo High Court's finding of no proof of causation, the Supreme Court stated:
Proof of causation is to be established not by the standard of natural science admitting of no
doubt, but rather by an overall examination of the totality of evidence informed by common
experience (keikensoku ni terashite). Where specific facts can be shown to have brought
about specific results with a high degree of probability (k5do no gaizensei), such that ordinary
people could hold a doubtless assurance of the fact of the [causal] relationship, that constitutes necessary and sufficient proof of causation.
Id. at 1419-20. The logically muddled nature of this pronouncement is aptly discussed in Shigeto
Yonemura, Runbdru shiki-go no nd-shukkeisu to inga kankei [Causationand Cerebral Hemorrhage
FollowingLumbar Procedure], 183 JURISUTO 154 (2006) (case commentary).
65. Kevin Clermont advanced a similar point in a recent essay. Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of
ProofRevisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469, 473 (2009). Appellate review of lower courts' factual findings,
however, is more rigorous in Japan than in the United States. The High Court will accept additional
evidence on appeal, which may supplement or contradict the District Court's fact-findings. See
MINSOHO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], art. 296-297; RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at
145.
66. See, e.g., SUZUKI ET AL., supra note 59, at 55, 193-194 (explaining ichid no suitei (rebuttable
presumption)); Shintar6 Kata, Iryd kago sosh5 (I) [Medical MalpracticeLitigation (I)], in MINJI HO III
[CIVIL LAW III] 265, 271-273 (Kaoru Kamata et al. eds., 2005) (same); cf Judgment of Supreme Court
Jan. 23, 1996, 50 MINSHO 1, 1571 HANREI JIHO 57 (perukamin-S case) (ignoring drug label indications,
absent rational reasons, is basis for negligence finding). See also Judgment of Tokyo Dist. Ct. June 7,
1967, 485 HANREI JIHO 21, 25-26, excerpted in RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at 67 (early
rebuttable presumption case).
67. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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and (3) judges' common practice of pressuring attorneys to settle for partial
compensation cases in which negligence is established but proof of causation is hazy.68
An indication that Japanese jurisprudence has moved toward a less
rigorous stance regarding proof burdens is the 2000 Supreme Court case
recognizing a "loss of chance" remedy for negligent failure to diagnose and
treat a malady for which timely diagnosis and treatment would have afforded the patient a "considerable possibility" (sot5 no kanosei), but not a "high
degree of probability" (k6do no gaizensei), of survival. 69 Given that the
preservation of life is a "fundamental value" worthy of legal protection, the
Court ruled that the value's invasion by an act of medical negligence required a legal remedy. 70 The Court later expanded the loss-of-chance principle to encompass cases in which medical negligence was followed not by
death but rather by serious impairment, but the level of impairment the
patient would have suffered absent negligence was not proven to a high
degree of probability.71 Subsequent cases in the lower courts have adopted
a principle of proportionate liability, scaling damages in rough accordance
with the percentage possibility of survival or full recovery had the defendant acted with due care. 72
4. Informed Consent and Related Actions
Apart from the duty to provide medical care meeting legal standards, physicians also have a duty to obtain from patients what has come to
be called (for lack of any equivalent expression in standard Japanese)
infa-mudo konsento. Adapting the Western concept of patient autonomy to
established customary patterns and departing from a line of previous cases
granting high deference to medical custom, Japanese courts came to recognize that in some circumstances traditional principles of medical ethics,
according precedence to the duty to save human life at all costs, must give
68. Interview with Wataru Murata, C.J. and Nozomu Hirano, J., Tokyo District Ct., 34th Div., in
Tokyo (Aug. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Tokyo Judges 2010 Interview]; interview with noted plaintiffs'
attorney Toshihiro Suzuki and associates, in Tokyo (Aug. 2, 2010). See also Shunko Muto, Concerning
Trial Leadership in Civil Litigation: Focusing on the Judge's Inquiry and Compromise, 12 LAW IN
JAPAN 23, 28 (1979), reprinted in MILHAUPT, RAMSEYER & WEST, supra note 7, at 185, 189-190
(2006) (judge's similar advice to trainee judges in 1979).
69. Judgment of Supreme Court Sept. 22, 2000, 54 MINSHO 2574, 1728 HANREI JIHO 31 (myocardial infarction case).
70. Id. The plaintiff was awarded a solatium (isharyd) of 2 million (US $18,000).
71. Judgment of Supreme Court Nov. 11, 2003, 57 MINSHO 1466, 1845 HANREl JIHO 63 (acute
encephalopathy and failure-to-transfer case).
72. Damages may be awarded even if the patient's chance of survival or full recovery was less
than 50 percent. Tokyo Judges 2010 Interview, supra note 68; interview with Yoshio Kata, noted
plaintiffs attorney, in Nagoya (July 26, 2010).
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way to patients' sometimes contrary personal values.73 A leading Supreme
Court case recognizing this principle affirmed a damage award to a Jehovah's Witness who was given a blood transfusion despite her contrary expressed intent. Although the procedure was medically successful-she
survived her cancer far longer than was predicted-the Supreme Court
nevertheless affirmed a consolation or solatium (isharyd) award for "emotional suffering" of the nominal sum of Y-500,000 (US $5,000).74 This case
constituted Japan's recognition-contrary to US informed consent precedents requiring "decision causation"7s-that a dignitary interest apart from
physical harm is worthy of protection in informed consent cases.
Parallel to physicians' duty to obtain the patient's informed consent
before treatment is the physician's obligation to explain accurately the results of treatment, including adverse results. This duty of explanation of
treatment outcomes (benmei gimu) is held to arise from the patientphysician contractual relationship. The principle has been tested in recent
years in cases in which patients and families were not given honest explanations of adverse outcomes, and courts have awarded solatium damages
for physicians' breaches of this duty. 76
5. Damages
Apart from solatium awards for intangible and dignitary injury,
damages in Japanese medical malpractice cases are standardized in accordance with injury severity levels as defined in the traffic accident compensa-

73. Detailed examinations of the development of informed consent theory and practice in Japanese
medicine can be found in Leflar, Informed Consent, supra note 6, and Leflar, Renaissance, supra note
9.
74. Jehovah's Witness case, supra note 7. Excerpts of both the High Court and Supreme Court
opinions are translated into English in MILHAUPT, RAMSEYER & WEST, supranote 7, at 347-356.
75. The term "decision causation," indicating the requirement that a plaintiff prove that had risk
disclosure been sufficient, the plaintiff would have decided on a different treatment course leading to
less physical harm, was coined in Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical
Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PTr. L. REv. 407, 438-439 (1980) and popularized in Aaron Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decisionmaking andthe Law of Torts: The Myth of
Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 60 (1989). For an argument that deprivation of informed
choice should give rise to an action for dignitary harm in U.S. medical negligence and prescription drug
litigation, see Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertaintyand Informed Choice: Unmasking
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REv. 257 (2005).
76. For example, in a suit against a hospital and its staff for brain damage suffered by a child from
heart stoppage due to a medication error and subsequent inadequate resuscitation efforts, the court
found that the hospital had engaged in a cover-up of the facts. In addition to awarding damages and
costs of k243 million (US $2.2 million) plus interest on the malpractice counts, the court awarded *l
million (US $9,000) for the contract breach. Judgment of Kyoto Dist. Ct. July 12, 2005, 1907 HANREt
JlHO 112, 124-125. See also, e.g., Judgment of Tokyo High Ct. Sept. 30, 2004, 1880 HANREI IHO 72;
SUZUKI ET AL., supra note 59, at 66.
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tion system. 77 Once negligence and causation are determined, the plaintiff
is entitled to an award within these fairly definite limits. Punitive damages
are not available.78
Awards for injury in Japanese medical malpractice cases do not
seem to differ radically in amount from awards in other advanced nations,
and may exceed them.79 Mark Ramseyer, drawing on a database of actions
filed in 2004, observed that in wrongful death cases, for example, median
and mean damage awards were respectively Y37.5 and Y40.6 million
(roughly US $350,000 at then-current exchange rates)so-recoveries higher
in real terms than those observed on average in the high-award US jurisdiction of Florida.81

77. SHIGEMI OSHIDA, YASUSHI KODAMA & TOSHIHIRO SUZUKI, JITSUREI NI MANABU IRYO JIKO
[A REAL-WORLD VIEW OF MEDICAL ACCIDENT CASES] 20-21 (2002). Pain-and-suffering damages in

death cases include awards to surviving family members for their grief, and may be adjusted up or
down for unusual circumstances. Id. Damage amounts for each level of injury severity are set out in
publications available not only to judges, lawyers, and liability insurers, but also to the general public.
See, e.g., MINJI KOTSO JIKO SOSHO: SONGAI BAISHO-GAKU SANTEI KIJUN [CIVIL TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
LITIGATION: COMPUTATION STANDARDS FOR DAMAGES] (Tokyo 3rd Bar Ass'n ed., 2006) (generally

known as "Akahon" ["the Red Book"]). For a description of damage calculations using the Red Book,
see Eric A. Feldman, Law, Society, and Medical Malpractice Litigation in Japan, 8 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 257, 266 (2009), originallypublished as Eric A. Feldman, Suing Doctors in Japan:
Structure, Culture, and the Rise of Malpractice Litigation, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL
PRACTICE 233 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009).
Damages of a given level of severity in medical malpractice cases may somewhat exceed those in auto
accident cases, perhaps taking into account the additional difficulty of proving malpractice liability.
Yoshiharu Kawabata, "Health-Related Litigation and Its Reform Through a Practitioner's Eyes," address at Penn State Dickinson School of Law Freeman Symposium on Health, Law, and Justice in Asia
(Apr. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Kawabata, Dickinson Lecture] (plaintiffs' attorney's estimation of 10-20
percent damages bonus in malpractice cases).
78. RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at 89 n. 53.
79. See Leflar & Iwata, supra note 12, at 200 & n. 40 (observing similar scale of damages in
Japanese and US wrongful death cases). By contrast, Eric Feldman views the Japanese scale of darnages
as both "more predictable and more modest" than US levels. Feldman, supra note 77, at 266. A caveat:
in performing international comparisons over time of malpractice awards (or anything else), yendenominated sums have grown considerably, relative to other currencies, concomitantly with the rise in
the yen's exchange value.
80. Ramseyer, MalpracticeClaims, supra note 23, at 653. Awards ranged from *200,000 to Y189
million (US $2,000-S1.6 million). Id. Judges arrive at these damage awards by calculating, in addition
to out-of-pocket medical and funeral expenses, the present value of the decedent's expected earnings,
subtracting almost half of that value for foregone living expenses, and adding a standardized amount for
pain and suffering-a method drawn from the standardized evaluation of traffic accident damages, see
supra note 77. Payments from collateral sources are not included in damage awards. For a helpful
summary of the law of damage calculations in tort, see Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort
Liability System in Japan,26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, 395-396 (2009).
81. A study of Florida malpractice awards from 1990-2003 found that the median and mean
payments for wrongful death claims were $195,000 and $290,000. Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the
Invisible Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida,54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315,
340 (2005) (tbl. 7); see also Leflar & Iwata, supra note 12, at 200 (similar analysis).
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Most malpractice claims are settled (either extrajudicially or during
the litigation process) or dropped, rather than being tried to judgment.82
Settlement negotiations in any medical malpractice case depend on assessments by plaintiff and defense counsel of the strength of plaintiff's proof of
three elements: (1) negligence, (2) causation, and (3) damages. One result
of Japan's standardized damages schedule is that prejudgment negotiations
become relatively predictable in respect of the damages element. Not only
judges, lawyers, and liability insurers, but hospital management and patients and families as well, have access to the formulas for calculating damage amounts. 83 In many US medical malpractice actions, plaintiffs' and
defendants' attorneys' widely varying assessments of the plaintiff's damages obstruct resolution of the case. In Japan, these valuation conflicts are
muted. This is a partial explanation for the lower litigation rates for Japanese medical malpractice claims in comparison with the US.84
Patients' medical and rehabilitation expenses resulting from medical misadventure are covered, in the main, by the health insurance programs in which virtually all patients are enrolled. As a legal matter, the
insurance programs have a right of subrogation to patients' claims against
providers whose negligence necessitated the expenses. As a practical matter, subrogation claims appear to be rare, although they are not unknown in
cases of serious impairment where medical and rehabilitation expenses are
very high.85 One reason for their rarity, according to an experienced hospi-

82. Attorneys experienced in medical malpractice have informed the author that the vast majority
of settled claims are never filed in court. See Leflar & Iwata, supra note 12, at 199-200 n. 35, and
interviews, infra note 106 (characterizing informally settled claims as "the sunken part of the iceberg").
Of claims filed in court, about 40 percent are litigated to final judgment. Ramseyer, Malpractice
Claims, supra note 23, at 625-627; Akihito Hagihara et al., Standardof Care and Liability in Medical
MalpracticeLitigation in Japan,65 HEALTH POL'Y 119, 125 (2003).
83. For an example of a damage calculation website for traffic accidents, see Shagai ishary6 jid6
keisanki/bengoshi jitsumu-y6 [Automatic Personal Injury Compensation Calculator for Attorneys'
Use], http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/-zi3h-kwrz/law2consocalj.html (last visited July 11, 2011). Damage
calculations are informed to some extent by the circumstances of each case, however, so repeat players
such as experienced lawyers will have a better sense of likely damages than members of the general
public consulting the "Red Book."
84. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and
Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (arguing that clear damage guidelines for traffic
accident cases promote out-of-court settlements, largely explaining low Japanese litigation rates);
RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at 90-99 (same).

85. Interview with Yasushi Kodama, a leading hospital defense attorney, Miyakezaka Sogo Law
Offices, in Tokyo (Aug. 14, 2010) (giving examples of patients left in a vegetative state). However, in
catastrophic injury cases the social insurance system limits patients' self-pay burden to 1 percent of
charges over an income-based ceiling (the "high-cost health care expenses system," k5gaku rydydhi
seido). Since collateral source payments (such as those from the social insurance system) are not recoverable under Japanese tort law, patients' recoverable damages-and consequently, the amounts to
which health insurers would be subrogated, standing in injured patients' shoes-tend to be much smaller than in most US catastrophic injury cases.
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tal defense attorney, is that in settled cases the release agreement frequently
contains a clause prohibiting the parties from disclosing the settlement or
its amount to anyone, even the social insurance entity. 86 If the insurer that
covered the patient's medical expenses never learns of the claim or the
settlement, and has no hawk-like monitor examining the case, then its subrogation right never comes into play.
B. Key Aspects offProceduralLaw and Practice
1. In General
Japanese civil litigation is conducted by professional judges without juries,87 in keeping with principles of German law introduced in the late
19th century. Typically two or three judges hear each case. Trials take place
in sequential hearings over a period of months or years, and attorneys for
all parties submit documentary evidence, testimony, and arguments on a
scheduled basis during this period.88 Medical malpractice trials in particular, with their typically complex and controverted facts, have been notorious for their prolonged duration. One infamous case, Dickensian in its
protracted length, required twenty years for its ultimate resolution in the
Supreme Court in favor of the injured patient. 89
Additional criticisms of the medical injury litigation system have
centered on inadequate discovery procedures and the difficulty of coping
with the allegedly frequent alteration of medical charts by hospital personnel, 90 making it hard for plaintiffs to obtain accurate evidence about adverse events. These criticisms have been answered to some extent by
expansion of discovery procedures in a 1998 reform of the Civil Procedure

86. Id. Kodama memorably characterized this phenomenon as "the puzzle of the Sphinx."
87. Under a recently-introduced reform, non-professional "lay assessors" (saiban-in) sit with
Saiban-in
serious
criminal
cases.
judges
in
hearing
certain
professional
no sanka suru keiji saiban ni kansuru h6ritsu [Act Concerning Participation of Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/HI6HOO63.html. See
Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan'sQuasi-Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translationof the
Act Concerning Participationof Lay Assessors in Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL'Y J. 9
(2005). This new system does not apply to civil cases.
88. See RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at 139-141 (describing discontinuous trial
system).
89. Judgment of Supreme Court Jan. 23, 1996, 50 MINSH-O 1, 1571 HANREt JIHO 57 (perukamin-S
case). For a moving account of the case by the plaintiffs attorney, see Yoshio Kat6, Kyisai shisutemu
gajiko bashi ni kind suru [Remedial Systems Prevent Accidents], 18 Ili HOGAKU [J. MED. L.] 94, 98-99
(2003).
90. See ISHIKAWA, supra note 23 (setting out examples of altered medical charts); Ramseyer,
Malpractice Claims, supranote 23 (noting that the practice "commonly happens").
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Code9l and by the routine availability on demand of patient charts through
evidence preservation (sh<5ko hozen) actionS92 and direct patient requests to
the medical facility.93
2. Discovery of Peer Review Findings
An issue that concerns physicians and hospitals in Japan, as it does
in the United States, is the availability for litigation purposes of peer reviews of adverse events. Such reviews have become more common in the
past decade pursuant to guidance issued by the health ministry,94 and are
standard procedure in cases handled by the Model Project. 95 Three legal
grounds support at least partial release of peer review documents: (1) national and local Freedom of Information rules applicable to public hospitals; 96 (2) an implied contractual obligation of hospitals to investigate
medical accidents and report the results to patients and families;97 and (3)
liberalized discovery procedures under the revised Civil Procedure Code.98
In a leading case interpreting the new discovery rules, the Tokyo High
Court ruled that the portion of the hospital report containing fact-gathering
interviews with hospital personnel was non-disclosable in order to protect
interviewees' "free formation of ideas," but the portion of the report containing "objective" conclusions about the patient's course, the causes of her
death, and proposed corrective measures must be disclosed. 99 Experienced

91. Civil Procedure Code, art. 220 (recognizing general principle of discoverability of specifically
identified documents, with some exceptions). See Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 561 (2001); Toshiro M. Mochizuki, Baby Step or Giant Leap? Parties' Expanded
Access to Documentary Evidence under the New Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, 40 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 285, 299-309 (1999).
92. See MINSOHO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] art. 234-242 (authorizing and governing evidence
preservation actions) (English translation available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/
Iawryre=02 (input "Code of Civil Procedure")).
93.

See NIHON ISHIKAI [JAPAN MEDICAL Ass'N], ISHI NO SHOKUGYO RINRI SHISHIN [PHYSICIANS'

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS GUIDE] § 2(7) (2008 rev. ed.), available at http://dl.med.or.jp/dl-med/
teireikaiken/200809101.pdf (recognizing physicians' duty to disclose medical records). The Japan
Medical Association expanded its view of patients' right of access to their medical records following
the enactment of the Law Concerning the Protection of Personal Information, Law No. 57 of 2003,
effective in 2005.
94. See Leflar & Iwata, supranote 12, at 205-206 (citing guidance documents).
95. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
96. See Information Disclosure Law, supra note 8.
97. See, e.g., Judgment of Kyoto Dist. Ct. July 12, 2005, 1907 HANREi JIHO 112, 124-125. See
also supranote 76 and accompanying text.
98. See Leflar & Iwata, supranote 12, at 206-213.
99. Judgment of Tokyo High Ct. July 15, 2003, 1842 HANREI JIHO 57, 1145 HANREI TAIMUZU
298 (Saitama Medical University case).
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defense attorneys routinely advise hospital clients to prepare for disclosure
of anything that goes into such case reports.1o
3. Judicial Administration Reforms
Responding to criticisms of excessive delays in medical malpractice litigation, the Supreme Court's administrative office instituted several
reforms aimed at improving the celerity and efficiency of the judicial process. The most noteworthy of these reforms were (1) clearly delineated
time-lines for trials;(2) concentrated evidence gathering; (3) the use of
judge-appointed expert witnesses; and (4) the creation of health care divisions (iryd shichilbu) in some metropolitan district courts. The first three
reforms were launched in 1998, at the time of a reform of the Civil Procedure Code. The health care divisions began operating in 2001.101
400

Figure 3. Disposition of Medical Malpractice Civil Cases Filed in Court, 1994-2010.102

As Figure 3 indicates, the duration of litigated medical cases began
declining even before these reforms were launched, but the reforms appear
to have succeeded in further reducing litigation delays.

100. Tokyo Judges 2010 Interview, supra note 68; interview with Yasushi Kodarna, a leading
hospital defense attorney, Miyakezaka Sogo Law Offices, in Tokyo (July 30, 2010).
101. For discussions of these reforms, see Feldman, supra note 77, at 273-275; Robert B Leflar,
Public and PrivateJustice: RedressingHealth Care Harm in Japan,4 DREXEL L. REv. 243 (2012).
102. Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Case Statistics, supranote 53.
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4. Settlement Practices, Overall Claiming Levels, and Malpractice Insurance Premiums
Malpractice case filings in court, set out in Figure 2 above, 0 3 represent only a fraction of all medical injury claims made by patients and
paid by medical providers or their liability insurers. Extrajudicial dispute
resolution is encouraged both by law104 and through the activities of entrepreneurial academics. o5 What proportion of all medical injury claims is
filed in court is difficult to ascertain, since insurers are famously close with
their payout data. Three leading Tokyo attorneys, one representing hospitals, one the Japan Medical Association, and the third plaintiffs, all suggested to the author that court-filed claims constitute merely the "tip of the
iceberg" of all claims.106
Mark Ramseyer has constructed a useful range of estimates of
overall medical malpractice claiming levels, including claims not filed in
court, from three sources: (1) court statistics, (2) insurance premiums, and
(3) informed observer estimates.107 Court claims data are firm: 1,110 mal-

practice claims were filed in court nationwide in 2004, for example, or one
lawsuit per 115,000 Japanese residents.108 Insurance premium data are less
precise, and require somewhat speculative manipulations.109 Estimates from
103. See supra note 53 and accompanying figure.
104. Saiban-gai funs6 kaiketsu tetsuzuki no riya no sokushin ni kan-suru h6ritsu [Law for the
Promotion of the Use of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution Procedures], Law No. 151 of 2004, as
amended, available at http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H I 6HO 51 .html.
105. See, e.g., YOSHITAKA WADA & TOSHIMI NAKANISHI, IRYO KONFURIKUTO MANEJIMENTO:
MEDIEISHON NO RONRI TO GIHO [MEDICAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: MEDIATION THEORY AND
SKILLS] (2006); YOSHITAKA WADA, IRYO ADR [MEDICAL ADR] (2009).

106. Interview with Yasushi Kodama, a leading hospital defense attorney, Miyakezaka Sogo Law
Offices, Tokyo, and Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Kuroyanagi, Kaneko & lwamatsu Law Office, Tokyo, in
Naha, Okinawa (Feb. 25, 2006); interview with Yoshiharu Kawabata, Kasumigaseki Sogo Law Offices,
in Tokyo (July 27, 2009) [hereinafter Kawabata interview]. Similarly, a 2001 study estimated that only
8 percent of malpractice claims are litigated. Kazue Nakajima et al., Medical Malpractice and Legal
Resolution Systems in Japan, 285 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1632, 1635 (2001) (drawing on JMA closedclaim data from 1973-81).
It was once a common practice for physicians and hospitals to offer mimaikin, small gifts of money in
token of sympathy, to injured patients and families (whether or not they had legal representation) before
any lawsuit was filed. See Robert B Leflar, PersonalInjury Compensation Systems in Japan: Values
Advanced and Values Undermined, 15 U. HAW. L. REV. 742, 749 (1993). That practice has become less
common since public distrust of medical skill and probity following the publicized disasters of 19992004 made the offering of small mimaikin seem "ridiculous." Interview with Yasushi Kodama, a leading hospital defense attorney, Miyakezaka Sogo Law Offices, in Tokyo (Aug. 4, 2011).
107. Ramseyer, MalpracticeClaims, supra note 23, at 663-668.
108. See Supreme Court Medical Malpractice Case Statistics, supra note 53. The population of
Japan in 2004 was about 127 million.
109. Ramseyer estimates that annual malpractice insurance premiums total about 2169 billion (US
$860 million). Ramseyer, Malpractice Claims, supra note 23, at 664. A recent estimate from Sompo
Japan, a major liability insurer, puts the total somewhat lower, at Y41 billion (US $510 million). Sompo
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knowledgeable Japanese observers of the claims made/court claims filed
ratio, while worthy of respect, are unverifiable.
Employing each of these sources in turn, Ramseyer provides a
range of estimates of annual medical malpractice claims in Japan based on
2004 data: between 2,230 and 13,875 total claims per year, in court and
out,e10 with the likely truth somewhere between. Japan's population is 127
million, so that represents a range of one malpractice claim annually per
9,000 to 60,000 residents. To give international perspective to that range,
annual malpractice claims (in court and out) in the US, with its population
of about 300 million, were credibly estimated in 2006 as 50,000 to 60,000,
that is, one claim per 5,000 to 6,000 residents,111 or between 1.5 and 12
times Ramseyer's estimated Japanese claiming rate. Annual medical malpractice claims filed in court (not extrajudicially) in 2004 in Canada, with a
population of 32 million, amounted to 1,083 claims,12 or one lawsuit per
30,000 residents, about four times Japan's per capita lawsuit filing rate of
one lawsuit per 115,000 residents.113 A reasonable approximate estimate
would be that a Japanese patient is one-fourth to one-sixth as likely to make
a claim against a medical provider as a North American patient.l14
Malpractice liability insurance to cover these claims is provided to
clinic physicians in private practice chiefly through private insurance plans
organized by national and prefectural medical associations, and to private
and many public hospitals through commercial carriers such as Sompo

Japan Insurance Inc., Ishi baish6 sekinin hoken ni tsuite [Physicians' Liability Insurance] (Aug. 3,
2011) (on file with author). Of this sum, roughly 60 percent is paid out to claimants. Ramseyer, Malpractice Claims, supra note 23, at 664.
110. Id.at667.
111. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical MalpracticeSystem: Structure and
Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 11, 13 (William M.
Sage & Rogan Kersch eds., 2006), cited in Ramseyer, Malpractice Claims, supranote 23, at 667.
112. Canadian Health Services Research Foundation, Myth: Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Plague
Canada (2006), available at http://www.chsrfca/publicationsandresources/Mythbusters/ArticleView/
06-03-01/70e601b8-487a-44d0-b390-4e4a0a453493.aspx, cited in Ramseyer, Malpractice Claims, at
667-668.
113. For an earlier comparison of malpractice claim filing rates in Japan and several Western
nations, see Nakajima et al., supra note 106, at 1638.
An extensive literature, unnecessary to explore here, seeks to explain the difference in propensity to
litigate between Japan and the US. For overviews of the debate, see, for example, JOHN OWEN HALEY,
AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 108-111

(1991); MILHAUPT,

RAMSEYER & WEST, supra note 7, at 141-176 (2006); Andrew D. Feld, Culture and Medical Malpractice: Lessons from Japan.Is the "Reluctant Plaintiff" a Myth? 101 AM. J.GASTROENTEROLOGY 1949
(2006).
114. Adding some credence to this estimate are statistics from major liability insurer Sompo Japan
indicating that physician and hospital liability insurance, as a proportion of all casualty insurance, is
0.37 percent in Japan and 1.52 percent in the U.S., approximately a I to 4 ratio. See Sompo Japan
Insurance Inc., supra note 109, at 9 (calculated from figures given in table).
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Japan and Tokyo Marine.I's Private physicians' standard insurance policies
come with a Yl million (US $13,000) deductible and cover liability up to
=Y100 million (US $1.3 million). Standard hospital policies cover the same
liability level, but typically with no deductible.116 Physicians employed by
hospitals receive standard coverage under their hospitals' policies, but some
physicians purchase additional personal coverage. 1' 7 Excess liability insurance covering large-claim liability above standard policy limits, considered
"vitally important" to self-insured hospitals in the US,119 is available in
Japan for liability in the range of 4 100-200 million (US $1.3-$2.5 million).
However, there are so few large claims that marketing reinsurance for
claims exceeding these amounts is uneconomical.'19
Liability insurance does not constitute a significant part of ordinary
practitioners' daily concerns, although hospital administrators must keep
the issue in mind. Liability insurance is regulated nationally by the Financial Services Agency, which has control over rate-setting. For physicians in
private practice, premiums are uniform nationwide: Y70,000 yen annually
(US $875, tax-deductible), with no differentiation based or practice specialty or location.120 Hospital-employed physicians pay somewhat less.121 Since
a 2004 premium revision, hospitals' insurance premiums, once also uniform, have varied somewhat depending on their bed count and treatment
levels. Hospitals insured by the Japan Hospital Federation with more than
500 beds, for example, pay =Y23,160 (US $290) per bed per year, while

115. Some national hospitals and national university hospitals cover liability costs through taxpayer-funded operating budgets or through a quasi-public entity, Kokuritsu by6in kik6 [National Hospital
Organization], rather than by purchasing liability insurance from private firms. See
http://www.hosp.go.jp/ (National Hospital Organization website).
For a useful description of the structure and operation of Japanese malpractice insurance systems at the
turn of the 21st century, see Nakajima et al., supra note 106.
116. Sompo Japan Insurance Inc., supra note 109, at 3-4.
117. Ramseyer, Malpractice Claims, supra note 23, at 664-665; Kawabata interview, supra note
106.
118. FRANK A. SLOAN & LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 247 (2008).

119. Interviews with Satoko Nishimura, insurance policy specialist, in Tokyo (July 19 and Aug. 3,
2011); see also Kodama interview, supra note 85 (effect of "high-cost health care expense system" on
liability for catastrophic injury).
120. This V70,000 premium is charged to JMA members owning clinics or small hospitals. Physicians may also purchase additional insurance to cover the
million deductible and liability for injuries
resulting from non-medical acts, such as slip-and-falls at physician-owned hospitals. This additional
insurance sells for V8,620 (US $110). Sompo Japan Insurance Inc., supra note 109, at 3-4.
121. Non-JMA members (mainly hospital-employed physicians) can purchase a standard policy for
Y55,000 (US $700), and physician trainees for V34,000 (US $400). Id. These doctors are typically
covered by the hospital's liability insurance anyway, so it is unclear to the author why many of them
purchase it.
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hospitals with 200-299 beds pay Y21,536 (US $270).122 Hospitals' premiums are experience-rated, to some extent; 123 physicians' premiums are
not. 124
5. Plaintiffs' Attorney Fees and Court Filing Fees
One barrier confronting patients considering medical malpractice
lawsuits, identified by numerous scholars and critics of the Japanese court
system, has been plaintiffs' attorneys' fee structure. 125 In contrast to the
United States, in which pure contingent fee arrangements with no up-front
payments are standard, in Japan plaintiffs customarily had to pay lawyers a
substantial up-front retainer according to a standardized schedule enforced
by the bar association, plus a filing fee to the court based on the amount
claimed. Together, these payments amounted to the yen-equivalent of several thousand dollars, closing the courthouse door to most seriously injured
patients without substantial means.126 Recent reforms have lowered these
barriers somewhat: court filing fees in high-damage cases substantially
decreased in 2003,127 and the bar association withdrew its attorney fee

122. ZENKOKU KOSHI BYOIN RENMEI NO BYOIN BAISHO SEKININ HOKEN-TO NO GOANNAI [JAPAN
HOSPITAL FEDERATION GUIDE TO HOSPITAL LIABILITY INSURANCE] 5-8 (2010); interview with

Mitsugu Ikeda, Japan Hospital Federation, in Tokyo (July 29, 2010). The Japan Hospital Federation
(JHF) includes a selection of public and private hospitals including the Japan Red Cross hospital group.
University hospitals carrying out high-risk procedures on a frequent basis, non-JHF members, are
reported to pay higher premiums in the range of Y30,000 (US $375) per bed. See Leflar, "Unnatural
Deaths, " supra note 13, at 8 n. 28. Smaller hospitals of less than 100 beds, where fewer high-risk
procedures are performed, are charged only V16,000 (US $200) per bed. Sompo Japan Insurance Inc.,
supra note 109, at 4.
123. Ikeda interview, supra note 122; Nishimura interviews, supra note 119.
124. Nishimura interviews, supra note 119; Nakajima et al., supra note 106, at 1635. Claims
experience for individual physicians is too limited to warrant the expense of compiling experience
ratings. Cf SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 118 (explaining limitations of experience rating in the US
medical malpractice insurance market). The actuarial difficulty of rating individual physicians' likely
future claim exposure is even greater in Japan, with its low litigation rates, than in the US.
125. See, e.g., Shoichi Maeda et al., The Problems of Medical MalpracticeLitigation in Japan: The
Significant Factors Responsible for the Tendency ofPatients to Avoid Litigation, 3 LEGAL MED. 56,
59-61 (2001) (retainer and filing fees as significant barriers to litigation); Eric A. Feldman, Why Patients Sue Doctors: The Japanese Experience, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 792, 796-797 (2009) (same);
Robert B Leflar, The Regulation of Medical Malpractice in Japan, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS &
RELATED RES. 443, 445 (2009) (same).
126. See Maeda et al., supra note 125, at 61 tbl. 9 (noting start-up fees of:V3 million-then about
US $24,000-for cases involving minor plaintiffs claiming lifelong earning deprivation). Occasionally
patients do file pro se claims, however, and once in a while, they win. Id at 59-60; interview with
Shunsuke Funase, successful pro se plaintiff, in Naguri, Saitama-ken (Aug. 9, 2009).
127. Feldman, supra note 125, at 797 n. 45. Filing a claim for Y10 million (US $125,000) now
requires a filing fee of=Y50,000 (US $625); a claim of Y100 million (US $1.25 million) requires a fee of
V320,000 (US $4,000). For the current filing fee schedule, see http://www.courts.go.jp/saiban/
tetuzuki/tesuuryou.html (last visited July 16, 2011).
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schedule as contrary to antimonopoly law. 128 Currently, some attorneys
handling malpractice cases for plaintiffs offer potential clients a degree of
flexibility in payment arrangements. For example, the attorney may charge
a fee for preliminary case evaluation smaller than the standard retainer and,
if the attorney takes the case, a discounted retainer amount may be paid in
installments; or the retainer may be decreased while the attorney's share of
the recovery, contingent on success, is increased. A contingency arrangement of 15-25 percent of the total recovery, with various adjustments, is
common. 129 Still, most attorneys are said to work within the basic framework of the former customary fee schedule.130
III. The No-Fault Compensation System for Obstetrical Injury
Japan has a notable history of enacting no-fault administrative
compensation systems providing relief for injured persons apart from that
available under the civil law, whose various limitations made compensation
in circumstances of high social concern difficult or impossible. These compensation systems include schemes aiding people injured by environmental
pollution, vaccinations, adverse drug reactions, infections from biological
products, blood transfusions, and asbestos exposure. 13 1 The most recent of
these no-fault administrative compensation systems provides relief to parents of a limited class of newborn infants with severe brain damage.
Birth injury cases are among the most serious in every legal system. Profound brain injuries compounded with lifelong rehabilitative needs
add up to enormous potential damages. Obstetricians face the prospect that
even a minor slip may subject them and their insurance carriers to vast
damage judgments.13 2
128. Kawabata, Dickinson Lecture, supra note 77.
129. Kata interview, supra note 72; Suzuki and associates interview, supra note 68. Kat6 and
Suzuki are both leaders of cooperating groups of plaintiffs' attorneys specializing in medical malpractice cases.
130. Kata interview, supra note 72; Suzuki interview, supra note 68; Feldman, supra note 77, at
264 & n. 24
131. See Osaka, supra note 80, at 400 (listing laws); Takao Tanase, The Role of the Judiciary in
Asbestos Injury Compensation in Japan, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 233,

247-248 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009) (noting centrality of administrative compensation rather than private litigation as Japan's "archetype"); Akio Morishima & Malcolm Smith, Accident Compensation Schemes in Japan: A Window on the Operation of Law in a Society, 20 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. REV. 491 (1986) (early analysis of development of no-fault systems). This significant phenomenon has received scant attention in many respected English-language treatises on Japanese law.
See, e.g., MILHAUPT, RAMSEYER & WEST, supra note 7; RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 43, at
125 & n. 58 (sole mention); ODA, supra note 20.
132. The subtleties of the litigation process in a birth-damaged baby case, and their impact on the

lives of plaintiffs, defendants, and their attorneys, are set out in memorable fashion in BARRY WERTH,
DAMAGES (2008) (first publishedl988).

2012]

MEDICAL MISADVENTURE IN]APAN

107

Litigation over birth-related injuries has generated considerable
concern among Japanese obstetricians. Among civil malpractice actions,
suits over obstetrical injuries have apparently resulted in a higher-thanaverage proportion of plaintiffs' judgments. 133 Of perhaps even greater
concern, prosecutors instituted criminal proceedings in 2006 (intensely
publicized, but ultimately unsuccessful) against an obstetrician who lost a
patient during a difficult delivery, casting a shadow of fear over the profession and giving impetus to the antiregulatory iry5 hakai movement described above.134
At the instigation of the Japan Medical Association, the Japan Society of Obstetrics & Gynecology, and the then-governing Liberal Democratic Party, the health ministry initiated a no-fault compensation system
for a limited class of obstetrical injuries.135 Launched on January 1, 2009,
the system is modeled in some respects on Florida's neurological injury
compensation system.13 6 It is administered by the quasi-public Japan Council for Quality Health Care (JCQHC), and is financed through a fixed perbirth levy from the social insurance system paid to private insurance companies that stand to reap profits (or possibly suffer losses) from the system's operation.137

133. See Nana Uesugi et al., Analysis of Birth-Related Medical Malpractice Litigation Cases in
Japan: Review and Discussion Towards Implementation of a No-Fault Compensation System, 36 J.
OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL RES. 717 (2010) (69 percent of sixty-four cases in database of
reported birth defect cases resulted in some recovery); compare Ramseyer, Malpractice Claims, supra
note 23, at 626-627 (some recovery in 30-40 percent of all medical malpractice cases litigated to final
judgment). It is possible, however, that the publishers' selection of cases to be reported biased the
database used by Uesugi et al. in favor of cases in which plaintiffs recovered. See id. at 642-644.
134. See supra, text pt. I.C.
135. Criteria for compensation are rather strict. Infants must be diagnosed with cerebral palsy of the
first or second degree of severity, must weigh more than 2000 grams at birth, and with few exceptions
must be bom after thirty-three weeks of pregnancy. Infants who die within six months and those whose
anomalies are congenital are excluded from compensation. Eligibility determinations are performed by
expert panels. The level of compensation is fixed: a one-time payment of Y6 million (US $75,000), plus
Y24 million (US $300,000) paid out over the first twenty years of the child's life, for a total of V30
million (US $375,000) per child. MHLW, Sanka iry6 hosh6 seido ni tsuite [The Obstetrical Compensation System], http://www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/bukyokulisei/i-anzen/sanka-iryou/index.html (last visited
Aug. 6, 2011).
136. The Florida system, like Virginia's Birth-Related Injury Fund, is a no-fault system for compensation of some serious neurological injuries sustained during or close to childbirth. For an overview
of the two systems, see SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 118, at 280-287.
137. The cash flow is circuitous. Funding for the system is generated by a levy of Y30,000 (US
$375) on each birth. JCQHC collects this amount from hospitals and maternity clinics that choose to
participate, and channels the money to the private insurers. The hospitals and clinics in turn collect an
identical amount from each expectant mother. By Cabinet Order, the amount of the lump-sum childbirth
subsidy that each mother receives from her health insurance plan was increased by the same V30,000 at
the time the compensation system was launched. See Taro Tomizuka & Ryozo Matsuda, Introductionof
No-Fault Obstetric Compensation, HEALTH POL'Y MONITOR (Oct. 2009), available at
http://hpm.org/survey/jp/al4/4.
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The system's stated goals are to provide prompt compensation,
without the need for legal proceedings, to parents of infants suffering cerebral palsy related to brain injuries during childbirth, and to improve the
quality of maternal care and prevent future cases.'3 8
Of particular note, Japan's obstetrical injury compensation system
was instituted in a manner that required no legislation. It is a voluntary
system-no childbirth facility is obligated to participate. It is operated outside of government by JCQHC. Social insurance funds finance the system,
and no specific legislative appropriation is needed. Parents still have a right
to sue medical providers for negligence, as before the system was instituted.
Although it is premature to evaluate the new compensation system,
it does appear to have gained traction. Essentially all childbirth facilities in
the nation (99.7 percent) have signed up to participate.139 For births occurring in 2009, the first year of operation, as of mid-2011 the system had
reviewed 152 applications for compensation and accepted 139.140 This appears to exceed by a substantial margin the proportion of cerebral palsy
cases compensated by the Florida system.141 For a recently launched program, the new system seems to be capturing a substantial proportion of
cerebral palsy cases. It remains to be seen whether the system's financing
will suffice in the long term, but it is running a considerable surplus at present, greatly benefitting participating private insurers (and imposing a substantial cost onto the social insurance system).14 2 The new system's effects

138. Tomizuka & Matsuda, supra note 137.
139. Dai-8-kai Sanka iry6 hosh6 seido un'ei iinkai shidai [Agenda for 8th Meeting of Obstetrical
Compensation System Management Committee], at 3 (July 6, 2011) (table in agenda materials), available at http://www.sanka-hp.jcqhc.or.jp/pdf/obstrics-meeting 08.pdf. The high participation rate is
chiefly explained by the fact that neither the hospital or clinic, nor the expectant mothers for whose
custom the hospitals and clinics compete, bear any financial risk from participation, due to the cost
pass-through explained in note 137 supra. Interview with Naoki Ikegami, Chair, Dep't. of Health Policy
& Management, Keio U. Sch. of Medicine, in Tokyo (Aug. 8, 2011).
140. Compensation System Committee Agenda, supra note 139, at 5.
141. The Florida compensation system, and a similar system operating in Virginia, are reported to
be compensating no more than 2 percent of cerebral palsy cases in those states. See SLOAN & CHEPKE,
supra note 118, at 282. One estimate placed the annual incidence of cerebral palsy cases in Japan at
about 630, Tomizuka & Matsuda, supra note 137, although it is unclear whether that estimate is based
on a disease definition congruent with the standards for compensation applied in the new Japanese
system. Supposing the estimate of 630 cases is not far off the mark, and well over 100 of them are
accepted for compensation in a year, it is clear that the Japanese system is capturing a far higher percentage of cases for compensation than the Florida system.
142. In 2009, the system's first full year of operation, it collected Y31.5 billion (US $340 million)
in premiums (Y30,000 x 1,054,340 births). Through the end of 2010, the system had accepted compensation claims for ninety-nine applications regarding those 2009 births, thereby incurring payment
obligations over twenty years totaling just Y3 billion (99 x Y30 million, see supra note 135)-only a
tenth of premiums collected. Compensation System Committee Agenda, supra note 139, at 17.
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on the quality of obstetrical care and on malpractice claiming practices
remain to be researched.
The success or failure of the no-fault obstetrical compensation system may also have implications for the future of Japan's medical malpractice system as a whole. Support for no-fault compensation comes from
what some outside observers might consider unlikely quarters. For example, the Japan Medical Association has long espoused the merits of a national no-fault compensation system for medical injures in general.14 3 The
Japan Federation of Bar Associations has likewise come out in favor of a
no-fault system, albeit of a different nature. 144 The Ministry of Health,
Labor & Welfare has just launched a blue-ribbon study commission on nofault compensation for medical injury. 145 Administrative compensation
systems based on no-fault principles have a solid grounding in Japanese
legal tradition over several decades.146 If the obstetrical injury compensation system proves successful, it is not beyond contemplation that broadbased support for a general no-fault compensation system for medical injury could emerge.
CONCLUSION
Distinctive features of Japanese law and society relating to medical
misadventure include the following:
Criminal law: In the early years of the 21st century, after a series
of publicized errors at hospitals of high repute focused public attention on
slipshod practices and dishonesty in the medical world, the criminal justice
143. See, e.g., "Bunben ni kansuru ndsei mahi ni tai-suru shdgai hosh5 seido" no saki jitsugen o
[Toward Prompt Institution of an "Injury Compensation System for Birth-Related Cerebral Palsy, "],
1080 NICHI-I NYOSU 1 (Sept. 5, 2006) (JMA publication quoting former JMA president Tar6 Takemi as
favoring
no-fault
compensation
for
medical
injury
in
1972),
available
at
http://www.med.or.jp/nichinews/nl80905a.html; Nihon ishikai [JMA], Iry6 jiko ch6sa seido no s6setsu
ni muketa kihonteki teigen ni tsuite [Basic Proposal for the Establishment of a Medical Accident Investigation System] 15-16 (June 2011) (favoring no-fault compensation system), available at
http://dl.med.or.jp/dl-med/teireikaiken/20110713_2.pdf.
144. Japan Federation of Bar Associations, "Iryb jiko mukashitsu hosho seido" no sbsetsu to
kihonteki na wakugumi ni kansuru ikensho [Proposal Concerning the Establishment and Fundamental
Framework of a "No-Fault Compensation System for Medical Accidents"] (2007), available at
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/070316_2 000.pdf. Attorney Yoshio Kat6,
leader of a distinguished group of plaintiff-side malpractice specialists, has long advocated a no-fault
system. See, e.g., Yoshio Kato, The Center for Patient Safety and Medical Victims' Relief: A Plan,
http://homepage2.nifty.com/pcmv/PCMV.html (last visited July 18, 2011). Katb has been influential in
persuading the bar association to support a no-fault system.
145. Iryb no shitsu no k6j6 ni shi-suru mukashitsu hosh6 seido-t6 no arikata ni kan-suru kentakai
[Commission for the Study of No-Fault Compensation Systems Conducive to Health Care Quality
Improvement], Kaisai ydk6 [Outline of First Meeting] (Aug. 26, 2011), available at
http://www.mhlw.go jp/stf/shingi/2r9852000001n6bl.htmi (click first attached file).
146. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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system, amplified by media reportage, sounded a wake-up call to a medical
profession previously lacking in accountability mechanisms. The health
ministry and organized medicine responded with various measures to improve patient safety; the extent to which those measures may have been
effective is unknown. Prosecutors' sometimes-excessive involvement in
policing medical quality, however, has recently provoked a reaction from
the medical profession eliciting media and public sympathy, perhaps contributing to an unusual string of acquittals of medical defendants, and clipping the prosecutors' wings.
Civil law: Civil Code provisions governing compensation for medical injury are fault-based and do not differ greatly in principle from rules
applied in North America and Western Europe. The burden of proof of
causation is relaxed in informed consent and loss-of-chance cases. Procedural reforms, including the institution of health care divisions of district
courts in some metropolitan areas, have helped speed up the pace of judicial proceedings, once notoriously glacial. Damage awards appear to be at
least as high on average as in the United States, at current exchange rates,
and are applied on a more consistent, standardized basis than in the United
States. The volume of claims filed in court is considerably lower than
North American levels, and has declined since the peak year of 2004. Most
compensation payments are made outside, not within, the court system.
Even so, overall claiming rates are low relative to North American practices. Malpractice insurance premiums, uniform nationwide for physicians in
private practice without regard to specialty or geography, are far cheaper
than in the United States.
Administrative compensation programs: Building on a tradition of
no-fault administrative compensation schemes for people injured by pollution, defective drugs, vaccines, blood transfusions, and asbestos, Japan
instituted in 2009 a nationwide no-fault compensation system for infants
with severe birth-related brain injuries. Backed by the medical establishment, financed through public funding, administered by a quasi-public
entity and offering substantial profit opportunities (as well as a theoretical
risk of loss) to private insurers, the new compensation system has already
achieved virtually universal buy-in by childbirth facilities hoping for protection from future litigation. Evaluation of the system's operation is still
premature but worthy of scholarly attention. Should the obstetrical compensation system prove successful, it may serve as a springboard for the
expansion of no-fault principles to cover a wider scope of medical injuries.
Both the Japan Medical Association and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations are on record as favoring a no-fault compensation system of some
sort, and a blue-ribbon commission is now examining the topic.

